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ABSTRACT  Non-timber forest products (NTFPs) draw attentions as resources that can 
improve rural livelihoods. This paper describes how local people in southeast Cameroon 
developed the trade in Irvingia gabonensis kernels, one of the most important NTFPs in the 
area, focusing on relationships between the Baka hunter-gatherers and Bantu farmers. 
Transactions between the Baka and Bantu are generally practiced as a form of “time-lagged 
barter”. When the Baka go to forest camps to gather the kernels, the Bantu give them a variety 
of goods in advance, typically alcoholic drinks, which account for 37% of the converted 
monetary value. Subsequently, the Bantu visit Baka camps to retrieve the kernels and transport 
them to sell to merchants in the village. For the Bantu, to give the Baka alcoholic drinks is the 
easiest way to maximize the amount of kernels they get. There is considerable disparity in the 
profit distribution between the Baka and Bantu. The latter get seven times more net profit per 
capita than the former. The unreflective promotion of NTFP trade will clearly widen the 
disparity between the ethnic groups and undermine the quality of life of the Baka. When 
promoting NTFP trade as a tool for improving the livelihoods of local people in southeast 
Cameroon, measures to reduce unhealthy goods from the transactions and to mitigate the 
disparity in profit distribution, based on a deep understanding of the complex relationships 
among local people, are essential.
Key Words: Baka hunter-gatherer; Bantu farmers; Inter-ethnic relationship; Time-lagged 
barter.
INTRODUCTION
Non-timber forest products (NTFPs) contribute to household and national 
economies across the Congo Basin (Ingram et al., 2012; Ingram, 2014) and are 
a way to conserve the forest while improving rural livelihoods (Peters et al., 
1989). In southeast Cameroon, as in many other tropical areas, many NTFPs are 
harvested and traded in quantities (Ayuk et al., 1999; Tieguhong & Nkamgnia, 
2012). Based on this background, international and non-governmental organizations 
associated with sustainable development have been encouraging local people to 
promote NTFP production.
Nuts (kernels) from trees such as Irvingia gabonensis are traded widely in 
southeast Cameroon (Hirai, 2014; Hirai & Yasuoka, 2020). One of the advantages 
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of NTFPs as a way to improve livelihoods is by realizing commercialization 
without drastically changing familiar ways of using resources.
However, recent studies have pointed out the risks of a NTFP-based approach, 
including confusion and disparities in local communities caused by the 
commercialization of NTFPs (Belcher & Schreckenberg, 2007). Therefore, when 
promoting trade in NTFPs to improve livelihoods in rural areas, we should pay 
careful attention to relationships among local communities; in southeast Cameroon, 
this involves the Bantu farmers and Baka hunter-gatherers. We should also not 
ignore the roles of merchants in rural villages who trade with regional towns in 
Cameroon.
In this context, this paper describes how local people developed a trade in I. 
gabonensis, focusing on the relationships between the Baka, Bantu, and merchants. 
Issues regarding the promotion of fair effective NTFP trade that can contribute 
to improving the quality of life of local people are discussed.
PEOPLES AND STUDY SITE
This study was conducted in Gribé, a village in the Boumba-et-Ngoko 
Department, the East Region of Cameroon (Fig. 1). The Baka live here, one of 
“Pygmy” hunter-gatherers, who interact closely with the Bantu, who primarily 
practice shifting cultivation. According to the Encyclopædia Britannica (2011), the 
word “Bantu” refers to a linguistic group that contains more than 500 distinct 
languages, occupying almost all of the southern part of African continent. Here, 
we use “Bantu” to refer to non-Baka people, including two ethnic groups that 
speak non-Bantu languages, living in the forest with the Baka.
The village of Gribé was founded 100 to 150 years ago by the Konabembe, 
a Bantu-speaking people. After its founding, the village expanded steadily under 
settlement policies of the French mandate, incorporating other lineages (Toda, 
2014). The current population of the village is approximately 800, with 
approximately 350–400 each of Baka and Konabembe. Cameroonian and foreign 
merchants started to stay in the village in the 1990s to purchase NTFPs.
In 2001, a logging company reconstructed a ruined road that increased the 
number of people travelling to and from the village and the volume of trade in 
NTFPs and bushmeat. In 2015, eight merchants settled in the village with their 
families. In this manner, the commercialization of NTFPs has progressed in Gribé.
The relationships between the Baka and Konabembe are similar to those between 
the Pygmies and neighboring farmers in other areas of the Congo Basin. Using 
the terms “forest world” and “village world”, Turnbull (1962) described cooperative 
and antagonistic relationships between the Pygmies and farmers (see also, Bahuchet 
& Guillaume, 1982; Dhellemmes & Macaigne, 1985; Takeuchi, 2001; Terashima, 
2001; Sakanashi, 2010; Rupp, 2011). At times, the farmers appear to exploit the 
Pygmies based on a hierarchical patron–client relationship. At other times, there 
is mutual dependence based on the exchange of forest products and agricultural 
crops. The relationships between the two groups can be characterized as ambivalent, 
i.e., cooperation and coercion, mutual dependence and repulsion.
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In Gribé, although the Baka and Bantu live alongside each other and 
communicate on a daily basis, there is still a hierarchical relationship with 
ambivalent feelings. There is a clear social boundary between them based on the 
settlement arrangement within the village and limited choice of marriage partners. 
The Bantu seem to have a higher capacity to adapt to modern systems, such as 
the state, capitalist market, and development and conservation initiatives, and have 
political and economic advantages over the Baka (Kitanishi, 2010; Hattori, 2012).
METHODS
In Gribé, the kernels of Irvingia gabonensis are gathered and traded in large 
quantities. However, the fruiting of I. gabonensis varies from year to year. It was 
plentiful in 2012, and most households in Gribé were engaged in gathering the 
kernels. However, the fruiting in 2013 was less than 10% of the level of the 
previous year. The Baka went to forest camps and gathered kernels, but the Bantu 
did not. In 2015, fruiting occurred in large quantities and lasted for longer. Data 
on the I. gabonensis kernel trade were obtained in July–October 2015, as outlined 
below.
(1) Locations of people during the Irvingia gabonensis kernel harvest
To compare the space use by the Baka and Bantu, the locations where 677 
people who live in the central quarter of Gribé stayed on the night of August 
31, 2015, were recorded. The 677 people included all generations and comprised 
about 85% of the village population.
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(2) Transactions between the Baka and Bantu
To understand transactions between the Baka and Bantu, 52 Bantu were 
interviewed in late August and 20 more in late September and early October. In 
all, 743 transactions were recorded, which probably included a considerable 
proportion of the transactions involving people in the Central quarter of Gribé. 
For every transaction, the seller, buyer, goods given in exchange for the kernels, 
and numbers of combo expected and actually received were recorded. The combo, 
a 2-liter enamel bowl, is used as a unit of transaction between the Baka and 
Bantu and between the Bantu and merchants. Kernels heaped in a combo weigh 
1.6–1.9 kg, depending on the degree of dryness.
Cash is rarely used in transactions between the Baka and Bantu. Therefore, to 
compare the profits made by the Baka and Bantu, the prices of deals made in 
the village and transactions at village stores were applied to convert the value of 
goods the Baka obtained to monetary values in francs de la Coopération financière 
en Afrique centrale (FCFA; 1 Euro = 655.957 FCFA). Camping in the forest is 
not thought to generate costs for the Baka, since it is a daily activity for them.
(3) Transactions between the Bantu and merchants
The net profits from trading the kernels for the Bantu and merchants were 
calculated as follows:
Net profit = Sales − Purchase costs − Other costs.
Sales of the kernels were calculated as the number of combos multiplied by 
unit price. Selling unit prices were estimated from transaction records at merchants’ 
stores in the village in July and August, 2015. When recording the transactions, 
the condition of the kernels, i.e., fresh, fire-dried, or sun-dried, was noted.
(4) Transactions between merchants
Transactions between village and town merchants involve large bags that contain 
about 77 combos of kernels on average. Transaction volumes were initially based 
on the number of bags and converted into the number of combos to compare the 
unit prices with transactions between the Baka and Bantu. Purchases and sales 
of 16 merchants based in Yokadouma, the central town of the Boumba-et-Ngoko 
Deportment, were monitored in August to October, 2015. The number of bags 
traded, purchase/selling prices, sellers/buyers, etc. were recorded. In addition to 
purchase costs, merchants have to pay transport costs, commissions, and taxes, 
which were identified through interviews conducted in Yokadouma.
RESULTS
I. Spaces Used by and Roles of the Different Actors in the Irvingia gabonensis Kernel 
Trade
As shown in Fig. 2, the production of I. gabonensis kernels involves different 
actors within a village.
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• The Baka and a much lesser number of Bantu who go to forest camps 10 
km or more from the village and stay for up to 2 months to gather the 
kernels;
• The Bantu, who visit Baka’s camps, collect the kernels from the Baka and 
transport them to the village in 30–40-kg baskets; and
• Merchants, who come from other areas and stay in the village, buy the 
kernels from the Bantu, or sometimes from the Baka, and dry the kernels 
under sunlight every day. The kernels are stored and sold to buyers visiting 
from Yokadouma.
In 2015, I. gabonensis trees around Gribé produced fruit in quantity. As shown 
in Table 1, 81% (212 of the 262 people whose locations were identified) of the 
Baka went to forest camps to gather kernels, most of which were located at least 
13 km from the village (Fig. 3). In addition, the places of sojourn were not 
confirmed for 91 Baka who most likely gathered kernels in the forest. Most of 
the kernels were sold, although the Baka and Bantu kept some to make pâté for 
their own consumption.
Of the Bantu, 65% (198/305) stayed in the village and 19% stayed in cacao 
fields located 7–8 km from the village. Only 6% stayed in forest camps to gather 
I. gabonensis kernels themselves. Of the 82 Bantu households in Gribé, at least 
one person from 73 households was involved in the I. gabonensis kernel trade. 
From interviews, the lengths of their visits to forest camps averaged 5.5 (range 
1–18) days, which were much shorter than those of the Baka, who spent weeks 
to months in the forest. The Bantu did not stay in the forest for longer periods 
because it was too much of a burden on infants and the elderly.
Fig. 2. Actors and their roles in the Irvingia gabonensis nut trade from the forest to village. The 
black (white) background indicates the forest (village) space.
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From the 73 households, 24 women engaged in the kernel trade. Because cacao 
growing, the major income source in this area, is principally managed by men, 
I. gabonensis is an important income source for women, particularly for single 
women. I. gabonensis is also a convenient cash income source for schoolchildren. 
Among the 73 households, 26 schoolchildren engaged in the trade and earned 
money by selling the kernels. As the fruiting season from July to August coincides 











Baka 15 3 212 2 14 16 91
Bantu 198 57 17 1 32
Merchant 19









Table 1. Locations a of the people in Gribé on August 31–September 1, 2015.
a The 677 people include all generations, including children and babies.
Fig. 3. Irvingia gabonensis kernels gathered by Baka girls. There is a combo filled with kernels 
beside the girl sitting in the back.
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Of the eight merchants, only one stayed in a forest camp to gather kernels. 
He is a Bamileke from the West Region who married a local woman. The others 
specialized in the purchase and storage of NTFPs.
II. Profit of Irvingia gabonensis Kernel Trade for the Baka and Bantu
The Bantu have two options for collecting I. gabonensis kernels in quantity: 
[i] to buy the kernels from the Baka and [ii] to gather the kernels themselves. 
More than 65% (46 of 72 people) only bought kernels, 14 Bantu both bought 
and collected kernels, and 12 only collected kernels themselves. The Bantu 
generally buy kernels from the Baka and of 743 transactions at forest camps in 
2015, 738 (99%) were with Baka. Sixty Bantu conducted exchanges with 222 
Baka. Baka sometimes sold a part of the kernels they had gathered directly to 
merchants, but most of the kernels were given to the Bantu.
Transactions between the Baka and Bantu are generally a form of “time-lagged 
barter” based on the traditional relationships between the two ethnic groups. When 
the Baka go to the forest, the Bantu give them a variety of goods in advance. 
For the 743 transactions, alcoholic drinks, including plastic packs of spirits and 
locally distilled liquor, made up 37% in terms of monetary value in FCFA (Fig. 
4). Out of 222 Baka, 45 (20%) used their kernels only to get alcoholic drinks, 
92 (41%) used at least half of their kernels to get alcoholic drinks, and 59 (27%) 
did not get any alcohol. The Bantu know that the Baka consume alcoholic drinks 
enthusiastically. Therefore, the Bantu give them alcohol and later visit the Baka 
camps to retrieve the kernels. In addition, the Bantu gave them crops that they 
Alcoholic drink 
(300,900 FCFA, 250 deals)
Crop 
(162,600 FCFA, 137 deals)
Electrical appliance 
(117,100 FCFA, 56 deals)
Clothing and shoes 
(92,900 FCFA, 57 deals)
Store-bought food 
(42,300 FCFA, 108 deals)
Tool 
(36,650 FCFA, 19 deals)
Tobacco 
(29,500 FCFA, 79 deals) Cash 
(20,700 FCFA, 4 deals)
Other 
(13,000 FCFA, 28 deals)
Fig. 4. Percentages in monetary value of goods given to the Baka by the Bantu in exchange for 
Irvingia gabonensis kernels.
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grow, including cassava flour and plantain (20%), as well as electrical appliances, 
including music players, flashlights, and batteries (14%), clothing and sandals 
(11%), store-bought food, including fried dough balls, rice, and consommé cubes 
(5%), tools, including machetes and steel wire (4%), and tobacco (4%). Cash 
accounted only for 3%.
In the 738 transactions, in exchange for 1,187 combos of kernels, 222 Baka 
obtained goods equivalent to 815,650 FCFA, with a median of 2,000 FCFA and 
average of 3,674 FCFA. The Bantu expected to get 1467.5 combos in exchange 
for the goods that they had given to the Baka. However, they retrieved only 1,187 
combos. This means that the expected rate of exchange was 556 FCFA, but the 
actual rate worsened by 24%, to 687 FCFA. Interestingly, this percentage equals 
the 25% in crop and store-bought food transactions (Fig. 4).
The unit price that the Bantu sold the kernels to the merchants for was much 
higher. In 33 transaction records, sun-dried kernels were sold at 2,167 FCFA/
combo, whereas fire-dried kernels were sold at 2,027 FCFA/combo in 81 records. 
Adopting 2,000 FCFA/combo as the unit price and assuming that the Bantu sold 
all the kernels collected, this totaled 2,374,700 FCFA. As 687 FCFA/combo should 
have been paid when they bought the kernels, the net profit for 60 Bantu was 
1,559,050 FCFA (median 19,650 FCFA, average 25,984 FCFA). The net profit 
per capita was seven times larger than the average profit of the Baka. This resulted 
from two factors: one Bantu deals with 3.7 Baka on average, and they sell the 
kernels to merchants at higher prices.
In addition, 26 Bantu gathered kernels themselves, 14 of whom also bought 
kernels from the Baka. They harvested 360.5 combos, which were sold for 721,000 
FCFA in total (median 26,000 FCFA, average 27,731 FCFA). Because they sold 
their kernels directly to merchants, they got much more profit per capita than the 
Baka did.
There were also considerable differences in profit among both the Baka and 
Bantu (Fig. 5). Only four of 222 Baka received 20,000 FCFA or more, while 
177 (80%) received less than 5,000 FCFA. A Baka man in his 20s earned much 
more than anyone else and traded 51.5 combos with nine villagers and obtained 
Total Average
Baka Gathering 222 1,187 815,650 0 815,650 3,674
Bantu d Purchase 60 1,187 2,374,700 815,650 1,559,050 25,984













Table 2. Volumes of Irvingia gabonensis kernels collected and profits of the Baka and Bantu.
a A combo is a 2-liter enamel bowl used as a unit of measure of the nuts. A combo contains 1.6–1.9 kg 
of I. gabonensis kernels, depending on the degree of dryness.
b The selling price was 687 and 2,000 FCFA/combo for the Baka and Bantu, respectively.
c Purchase cost 687 FCFA/combo.
d Fourteen Bantu obtained nuts by both purchasing them from the Baka and gathering them themselves.
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Fig. 5. Distribution of net profits converted into monetary value for the Baka and Bantu involved 
in the Irvingia gabonensis kernel trade. For the Baka, different colored bars indicate monetary values 
of different categories of goods they obtained in exchange for the kernels, i.e., alcoholic drinks, 
food, and others. For the Bantu, different colors indicate different ways of collecting kernels, i.e., 
those bought from the Baka and those gathered by the Bantu themselves.
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goods equivalent to 45,100 FCFA, including alcoholic drinks, crops, and steel 
wire. He was an exceptional case. Many Baka got only alcoholic drinks or tobacco.
The profits of the Bantu also varied, but were generally much higher than those 
of the Baka. Of 72 Bantu, 46 (64%) earned 20,000 FCFA or more, and only 
three got 5,000 FCFA or less. Notably, 13 Bantu earned more than 50,000 FCFA. 
This is because the Bantu’s profits can be increased by trading with more Baka 
partners, whereas the Baka’s profits can be increased only by working longer. In 
addition, the Bantu sold all of the kernels they gathered, whereas most of the 
Baka were involved in time-lagged barter, which is embedded in their traditional 
relationship with the Bantu, before they accessed the village merchants. However, 
the Bantu do not always retrieve kernels equivalent to the goods given to the 
Baka, so that they cannot increase the number of Baka partners unconditionally.
III. The Value Chain of Irvingia gabonensis Kernels
The Baka mainly engage in gathering I. gabonensis kernels in the forest and 
the Bantu farmers are responsible for transporting the kernels to the village and 
drying them. Merchants purchase and accumulate the kernels in the village and 
then ship them elsewhere. Through these serial transactions, the unit price of the 
kernels increases (Table 3). In the forest camps, where transactions are made 
between the Baka and Bantu, the Baka were paid a variety of goods equivalent 
to 687 FCFA per combo of fresh or semi-dried kernels, although rate expected 
by the Bantu was 556 FCFA per combo.
In the village, where transactions were mainly between the Bantu and merchants, 
2,027 FCFA/combo were paid for fire-dried kernels and 2,167 FCFA/combo for 
sun-dried kernels, based on 81 and 33 transaction records, respectively. For fire-
dried kernels, the Bantu gave the Baka 688 FCFA/combo and obtained 2,027 
FCFA/combo from the merchants. Therefore, the Bantu earn 1,340 FCFA/combo 
net profit. Although they have to go to the forest camps to retrieve the kernels 
and transport them in 30–40 kg baskets, the monetary costs of this are negligible.
The selling price depends on the condition of the kernels. Whitish kernels dried 
under sunlight have higher economic value. In this case, the net profit for the 
Bantu increases to 1,480 FCFA. However, because there is little sunlight in the 
forest, the Baka dry the kernels on fires using a drying rack (lokala in Baka) to 
avoid mold. During fire-drying, the smoke makes the kernels darker and oil leaks 
out, decreasing their economic value. Therefore, it is important that the Bantu 
collect the kernels as soon as possible before they darken, and that they dry the 
kernels themselves in the village. For merchants in the village and Yokadouma, 
sun-dried kernels are also more profitable than fire-dried kernels (Table 3).
The net profit for sun-dried kernels for the Bantu (1,480 FCFA/combo) exceeded 
that of merchants (1,039 FCFA/combo), probably because the Bantu are tough 
bargainers. However, even if profit per combo is lower, the merchants each earn 
much more because they each trade with many Bantu. Based on the trade of 
1,187 combos, the merchants earned a net profit of 148,000 FCFA each (= 1,187 
combos × 1,000 FCFA/8 merchants), compared with 25,984 FCFA per Bantu.
In addition, merchants can earn more if they can wait until the price in 
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Yokadouma increases. The selling price increased as the season progressed from 
2,500 FCFA/combo at the end of August to 4,500 FCFA/combo 20 days later. 
Merchants with enough warehouse space can wait for the price to rise. The same 
can be said for merchants in Yokadouma. According to Table 3, transactions for 
fire-died kernels were in the red. In practice, however, they deal in much larger 
quantities of a variety of NTFPs, have more storage space, and can wait for the 
prices in cities to increase.
The Bantu also knew that the selling price would increase. However, many of 
them needed cash to enroll their children in school in early September and sold 
the kernels by that time. Notably, the exchange rate between the Baka and Bantu 
was consistent throughout the season. Although it can vary depending on whether 
the Bantu retrieve the expected volume of kernels, the expected price was hardly 
affected by the market economy, at least within a year.
DISCUSSION
In southeast Cameroon, NTFPs have become major commodities over the past 
10 years. Among them, Irvingia gabonensis provides the greatest economic 
opportunity for the Baka hunter-gatherers and Bantu farmers. As I. gabonensis 
kernels can be harvested without damaging the capital, i.e., the trees, increases 
in kernel harvest are sustainable. In fact, Hirai & Yasuoka (2020) calculated that 
I. gabonensis trees in the study area generally produce 10 times more kernels 
than could be gathered by everyone with maximum labor input. It is also difficult 
for the Bantu to invest more labor in kernel gathering because its fruiting season 
overlaps with the cacao season, the most important source of cash income for 
them. 
Therefore, there are two ways to raise the profits from I. gabonensis kernel 
trade for local people: raising the unit price and expanding Baka involvement in 
the trade.
As shown in Table 3, in terms of net profit per unit volume of kernels, the 
Bantu received the largest benefits among the actors in the value chain in the 
area. So, it would be difficult to increase the selling price between the Bantu and 
merchants. However, there is still room to raise the selling price by improving 
kernel condition. As mentioned above, in forest camps where the sunlight is 
limited, the Baka dry the kernels using fires to avoid mold. Smoke darkens the 
kernels and reduces their economic value. An innovation in drying and storing 
kernels is therefore awaited.
The latter option might seem much easier, but it might undermine the Baka 
quality of life. As shown in Fig. 5, many Baka were not largely involved in the 
trade. As kernels are still available in the forest, the more they work, the greater 
their reward. However, this would increase the consumption of alcoholic drinks 
by the Baka because their involvement in the trade is based on “time-lagged 
barter” embedded in traditional inter-ethnic relationships with neighboring Bantu 
farmers. For the Bantu, the number of Baka partners is an important factor in 
maximizing the amount of kernels they get. The easiest way to do so is to give 
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the Baka alcoholic drinks to get them involved in “time-lagged barter”.
Note also the disparity in profit distribution between the Baka and Bantu; 
promoting NTFP trade is be likely to widen this. As shown in Table 2, there is 
currently a considerable difference in the net profits of the two due to the Bantu’s 
greater bargaining power with merchants and the Baka. Therefore, even when the 
selling price between the Bantu and merchants rises, the Bantu obtain a large 
part of the additional profits, which leads to further disparity between the two.
This situation may not change if the Baka trade the kernels directly with 
merchants. As Yasuoka (2006) described, most merchants also sell alcoholic drinks 
to retrieve the money they pay to the Baka. Moreover, direct transactions with 
merchants may lower the selling price because the Baka are not as tough when 
bargaining with merchants as are the Bantu.
It is difficult to change the established trade system because “time-lagged barter” 
is embedded in the traditional “patron–client” relationships that cover not only 
the I. gabonensis kernel trade but also wider social relationships. If we consider 
only the kernel trade, the Bantu seem to exploit the Baka. However, as mentioned 
above, their relationships have been established over 10s or 100s of years of 
social interactions and are much more complex than can be grasped from an 
economic aspect.
It is certain that, as long as “time-lagged barter” exists, unreflective promotion 
of NTFP trade will widen the disparity between different ethnic groups and even 
undermine the Baka quality of life. When promoting NTFP trade as a tool for 
improving the livelihoods of the people of southeast Cameroon, measures reducing 
unhealthy goods in the transactions and those mitigating the disparity in profit 
distribution, based on a profound understanding of the complex relationships 
among local people, are essential.
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